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Purpose:  
This paper aims to give an empirical overview of the ‘privatization’ of security 
(or, in a more narrow sense, policing) services within the former countries of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia namely, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Observations are put in light of 
the extant literature on private policing worldwide.
Design/Methodology/Approach: 
The paper draws on a literature review of academic publications, NGO-reports 
and other relevant written sources.
Findings: 
Although it is not possible to offer a full picture of the current developments 
in the region, we argue that the rise of private security markets shows significant 
variety throughout former Yugoslavian countries, as does the level of state 
regulation. Moreover, contrary to the views of doomsayers critical of the provision 
of commercial security, academics and observers alike are optimistic about private 
security personnel becoming a legitimate and stabilizing presence in post-conflict 
zones such as the Balkans. 
Research implications: 
The persistence of divergence in private policing trajectories within the former 
Yugoslavia underscores the need for more detailed cross-national studies that take 
account of differences, as well as similarities, in how commercial security industries 
are governed and regulated by state institutions.
Practical implications: 
Public as well as private policy-makers in the field of security serve as 
appropriate anchor points to facilitate, direct and regulate private policing activities 
across the former Yugoslav republics. 
Originality/Value: 
The growing body of knowledge on private policing is heavily suffused 
by predominantly North American, Canadian, British and Australian studies. 
Nonetheless, research from countries outside the English speaking world has much 
to contribute to an understanding of private security industries. An examination of 
the Balkan countries that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia is particularly 
interesting when viewed as a post-conflict legacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the field of criminal justice studies it is widely acknowledged that private 
security industries are mushrooming rapidly. Much research has been conducted 
on the so-called ‘manned guarding sector’. This sector is, by number, the largest 
and most visible group of security staff within national borders. The presence of 
private security guards (or private security ‘officers’ as they are often referred 
to) has considerably intensified alongside the police and other (quasi-) policing 
bodies that are regularly deployed for safeguarding society (Crawford, Lister, 
Blackburn, & Burnett, 2005; Johnston, 2003). Previous comparative work in this 
area has unequivocally highlighted the substantial contribution of private security 
companies to internal security within Europe, and worldwide (South, 1994; van 
Steden, 2007; van Steden & Sarre, 2007; de Waard, 1999). That trend appears to 
be continuing, and possibly even accelerating. According to the Confederation of 
European Security Services (CoESS, 2008), an umbrella organization for national 
private security associations, the European market for manned guarding services, 
in overall numbers, has grown from about 1 million in 2004 to over 1.6 million 
in 2008 – an increase that is, to a certain extent, due to changes in data gathering 
methodology. On top of the 27 EU-member states, the report now also covers 7 
countries outside the Union (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Rumania, Serbia and Turkey), mainly located in South-Eastern Europe. Commercial 
security companies have thus become part and parcel of a highly significant 
‘pluralization’ (Loader, 2000) or ‘diffusion’ (Kempa, 2007) of policing models across 
the European continent.  
Nonetheless, nearly all academic research published in English is concerned 
with Anglo-Saxon countries. Most attention has been given to the United States 
(e.g. Forst & Manning, 1999; Pastor, 2003), Canada (e.g. Rigakos, 2002), the United 
Kingdom (e.g. Button, 2002; Jones & Newburn, 1998), Australia (e.g. Sarre & 
Prenzler, 2009) and New Zealand (e.g. Bradley & Sedgwick, 2009). In this respect, 
there remains (relatively speaking) a dearth of cross-national research into private 
security – a ‘blind spot’ that is reflected in the lack of international comparisons 
in police sociology and criminology more generally (Mawby, 1990; Manning, 
2005). Yet, at the same time, there seems to be an increasing awareness of the vital 
contributions cross-national comparisons can make to the body of knowledge of 
criminal justice studies, particularly in the area of ‘public’ (state) and ‘private’ (non-
state, commercial) policing (Jones & Newburn, 2006). Comparative studies are 
fundamental to a better understanding of the similarities, as well as the differences, 
between national contexts. They allow us to gain deeper insights into the reach 
and impact of the privatization phenomenon as it manifests itself in various 
jurisdictions.
The massive growth of private policing in countries making up the former 
Yugoslavia is an understudied field. Our aim is to provide a cautious illustration 
of the reach and regulation of commercial security industries in these countries. 
Ronald van Steden, Rick Sarre
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This overview is unavoidably broad and somewhat superficial, but is explored 
here, notwithstanding, for three reasons. First, we know very little about private 
security in ex-Yugoslavia when compared to developments in other parts of the 
globe. Second, unlike the rest of Europe, Yugoslavia was torn apart by wars raging 
in the early 1990s – a reality which, for better or for worse, has affected public as 
well as private policing trajectories in many and assorted ways. Third, and related 
to this, the countries arising from the Yugoslavian wars of independence each have 
followed diverse paths in developing their political and legal systems in recent 
years. For example, Slovenia is now a calm and democratic country, and became a 
member of the European Union (EU) in 2004 (Mrak, Rojec & Silva-Jáuregui, 2004). 
It introduced the Euro in 2007. By way of comparison, Kosovo, since February 
2008 recognized as an autonomous and independent state, is still a highly disputed 
territory in the Balkans, and is very much in transition both economically and 
politically. 
Against this background, we provide a modest comparative snapshot of 
commercialized security industries which have developed after the breakup of 
Yugoslavia. In order to undertake this task, we have decided to use the country 
reports published by the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control 
of Small and Light Weapons (SEESAC, 2005), mandated by the United Nations 
in support of enhancing long-term development and stability in the region. 
Furthermore, we make use of data provided by the Confederation of European 
Security Services (CoESS, 2008). In addition, several academic publications (e.g. 
Sotlar, 2009) offer us knowledgeable information and some useful statistical data. 
In the paragraphs to follow we begin by briefly introducing the concept of ‘private 
security’. We then draw a picture of private security growth and the means by 
which industries are monitored and regulated in the countries under review. 
Finally, we discuss the role of states in regulating private security and propose 
some topics for future empirical investigation.
2 THE CONCEPT OF PRIVATE SECURITY
Private security, and more specifically private policing, is hard to define. Indeed, 
Joh (2004) refers to it as a ‘paradoxical’ term. Although the law draws a distinction 
between ‘public’ and ‘private’ industries, these sectors in the policing world 
are increasingly difficult to tell apart. Today, the police and the private security 
industries perform many of the same tasks and have many of the same sorts of 
responsibilities (Stenning, 2000). Similar to the police, security personnel perform, 
among other things, patrolling, order maintenance and investigation activities as a 
central component of their occupation and duties. However, security personnel also 
do many things that are different from the police. Police officers have never been 
engaged in, for example, housekeeping and customer care duties like reception 
work, the storage of keys and the management of car parks (Wakefield, 2006). 
Yet, as a manifestation of the larger commercial security industry, private policing 
involves the purchase and sale of services in a market place with the central goal to 
protect persons and property against physical threats and damages (South, 1988; 
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Wakefield, 2003). Given all of the above, we define the phenomenon thus: private 
police are those persons who are employed or sponsored by a commercial enterprise on 
a contract or ‘in-house’ basis, using public or private funds, to engage in tasks where 
the principal component is a security or regulatory function (see Sarre, 2005; Sarre & 
Prenzler, 2009). Drawing on this definition, we focus on the presence of those non-
state private security personnel who are hired and financed to engage in a large 
variety of policing roles and tasks.
It is paramount to realize that ‘privatization’ of policing has commonly not 
occurred in terms of literally ‘hiving off’ government services and assets, as has 
happened to banking, electricity supplies and public transport services in many 
countries. Nevertheless, there may be exceptions to this in former Yugoslavia, as 
there is evidence of (paramilitary) private security forces becoming affiliated with 
the state. As Caparini and Marenin observe: ‘[t]hese [private security] agencies 
have become providers of many functions conventionally performed by the state, 
including law enforcement, but also administrative justice, resolving disputes, 
protecting people and property, debt enforcement and intelligence-gathering’ 
(Caparini & Marenin, 2005: 9). As such, we can speak of a ‘shadow state’ or ‘dark’ 
security networks (Raab & Milward, 2003), largely controlled by an economy of 
organized crime groupings that do not hesitate to resort to brutal intimidation and 
violence. There is little reason to doubt that this type of network has spilled over 
into lawful forms of policing and protection in Central and Eastern Europe. 
With policing being restructured along the lines of commercial companies and 
commodity markets, questions have been raised about (assumed) changes in the 
nature and shape of police work (Bayley & Shearing, 1996; Jones & Newburn, 2002); 
about social and ethical issues surrounding the (presumed) ‘exclusionary nature’ 
of private policing (Crawford, 2006; Loader, 1997); and about the accountability of 
private security industries (Jones, 2007; Stenning, 2009). The upsurge of a (vigilante) 
‘market for force’ (Avant, 2001) adds an extra dimension to the challenges private 
security pose to nation-states and their ‘civil’ societies. In the following section, 
we take an inventory of the private security situation in the states of the former 
Yugoslavia on which future empirical research can be built. Subsequently, we delve 
into the theoretical discussions highlighted above.
3 AN EMPIRICAL SNAPSHOT
The region of the former Yugoslavia now presents a diversity of countries ranging 
from consolidated democracies to quite unstable territories. Sound data are very hard 
to obtain from the latter category. Despite the fact that any attempts to measure the 
scope and reach of private security are thus problematic, there is consensus among 
observers about the mounting pervasiveness of commercial guarding companies in 
these countries (CoESS, 2008; SEESAC, 2005; Sotlar, 2009). The snapshots provided 
in the following paragraphs and in Table 1 devote attention to the size of private 
security relative to the public police and the accountability (regulation) of private 
security industries. Some assorted information about, for example, permission to 
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carry firearms and public-private cooperation, is also included in the discussion 
where such information is available and of interest.
Country Population
(million)
Police 
officers
Security 
officers
Police / 
private 
security ratio
Private security/
100,000 
population 
Slovenia 2.0 8,500 6,200 1:0.73 1/310
Croatia 4.5 19,000 16,000 1:0.84 1/357
Serbia 7.4 34,000 >28,000 1:0.82 1/379
Kosovo 2.1 6,300 2,600 1:0.41 1/124
Bos-Herze 4.6 16,000 2,000-4,000 1:0.12 1/44
Macedonia 2.0 12,000 16,000 1:1.33 1/800
Montenegro 0.7 4,500 2,500 1:0,55 1/357
Europe 
(34 countries)
594.6 2.1 mill 1.6 mill 1:0.76 1/268
Sources: SEESAC (2005); CoESS (2008); Sotlar (2009); Bakreski & Miloševska (2009);  
Kržalić (2009).
3.1 Slovenia
Slovenia is a member of the European Union, one of the smallest in terms of 
population, namely approximately 2 million people. The country’s private security 
industry employs around 6,200 personnel (Sotlar, 2010). With an 8,500 officer strong 
police force, this represents a ratio of 1 to 0.73 police to private security. There 
are about 120 commercial firms in operation. Compared to other ex-Yugoslavian 
countries, Slovenia enjoys a long-standing tradition of regulation. Initial legislation 
dates back to 1994 when the National Assembly of Slovenia introduced legal 
regulations to the private security market. A Chamber for Private Security was 
established which, according to the Ministry of the Interior, oversaw standards of 
skills, professionalism and knowledge testing within the industry, and approved (or 
withdrew) licenses. In 2003, this situation changed with the introduction of the Act 
on Private Security. Under the new Act, the Ministry of the Interior became solely 
responsible for granting and revoking working permits to companies, whilst the 
Chamber kept some public powers connected to training programs and the formal 
examination of private security staff. Three years later, in 2007, amendments were 
made to the 2003 Private Security Act after fatal incidents that partly resulted from 
private security staff violating procedures. In response, the Ministry of the Interior 
took back all remaining powers from the Chamber. Membership of the Chamber 
is now voluntary for companies, and observers expect that it will increasingly face 
competition from other private security chambers and associations in the years 
to come (Sotlar & Meško, 2009). Whether these shifts in regulatory activity have 
had the desired effect, however, is a moot point. Research among college students, 
for example, shows that they ‘do not necessarily have a positive view of security 
officers’ (Nalla, Meško, Sotlar, & Johnson, 2006: 320). At the heart of this observation 
Table 1: 
Comparison 
of police and 
private security 
in ex-Yugoslavia
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is a negative attitude of citizens and professionals towards the industry. Indeed, 
relationships between the public and private security sectors in Slovenia have been 
depicted as ‘living apart together’. An important explanation here is resistance 
from the police to establish solid partnerships with private security companies 
(Meško, Nalla, & Sotlar, 2005). Nevertheless, it can be concluded that police officers 
and security guards for the most part coexist reasonably well in Slovenia.
3.2 Croatia
Croatia (4.5 million inhabitants) has had a more dramatic recent history than its 
neighbor Slovenia. During a ten day independence war in 1990, Slovenia suffered 
little from military actions, while, in Croatia, the collapse of the state was heavy and 
destructive. The transformation from totalitarian socialism to a democratic, market-
based society placed great stress on its police force. The ‘new’ Croatian police 
(currently 19,000 officers strong) have sprung up from the relics of a dictatorial 
organization, with a military-style image, and communist mentality (Ivković & 
Haberfeld, 2000). Private security then grew from widespread outsourcing of the 
protection of businesses, persons and property, a development that dates from the 
reintroduction of a market economy in 1991, and rising crime rates thereafter. There 
are 16,000 security guards now registered in Croatia. This comes down to a police/
private security ratio of 1:0.84. The industry covers 250 commercial companies, 
which are regulated by the 2003 Private Protection Act, the 2007 Firearms Act and 
legislation surrounding the transportation of cash and valuables, along with by-
laws to meet education and training, examination and licensing criteria. Although 
the majority of companies are appropriately regulated, there have been allegations 
of organized crime infiltrating some private security sectors. Furthermore, 
security companies are important job providers for demobilized paramilitary and 
parapolice forces. As indicated by Sotlar’s (2009) analysis, contemporary private 
security industries in Croatia are, in overall terms, functioning in a modern and 
transparent way. However, a few companies are trying to alter regulations in ways 
which favor their employees in carrying not only light handguns, but also heavier 
weapons such as rifles and shotguns. If such legislation were to pass, it may 
provoke an undesired spiral of violence, because criminals are likely to retaliate 
using the same firepower. 
3.3 Serbia 
With a population of 7.4 million people, Serbia is the largest of the former Yugoslav 
republics. Its private security industry gained momentum during the 1990s due to 
a burgeoning ‘grey economy’ in the aftermath of UN-imposed sanctions against the 
country. Its economy lacked official police protection and therefore its businesses 
often explored the security services offered by armed mafia syndicates. After 
the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in October 2005, the situation has moved 
towards stabilization. An Association of Companies for Physical and Technical 
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security aims to ‘sober’ the industry (Petrović, 2008: 50), one that employs 28,000 
to 60,000 guards at this moment. Nevertheless, private security continues to be a 
precarious business in Serbia. Different from policing models in Western Europe, 
the main incentive for Serbian private security to develop and grow was not neo-
liberal policy ‘responsibilizing’ third parties in the field of criminal justice, but the 
complete collapse of basic state functions. Consequently, a significant number of 
entrepreneurs made a leap from semi-criminal careers to legal forms of policing 
activities. Moreover, after the Balkan Wars, many (paramilitary) soldiers returned 
from the battlefield where they had been trained to use armed force. These people 
had few other choices than to seek employment in the security industry, which 
further contributes to a worrisome intermingling of violence and commercial 
policing. Until today, special legislation regulating private security is lacking 
in Serbia. Even worse, besides the private sector, the public police sector, too, 
struggles with institutional changes and stagnating reforms. Davidović refers to 
a so-called ‘4D’ project of ‘depolitization’, ‘decentralization’, ‘decriminalization’ 
and ‘demilitarization’ – all ambitions that ‘have often been publicly championed’ 
by Serbia’s public administration, but ‘were not systematically developed as 
government policy’ (Davidović, 2009: 345). Private security companies and the police 
alike can help reconstruct policing in Serbia, but only if they are professionalized 
in line with EU-standards. 
3.4 Kosovo
The entity of Kosovo (slightly more than 2.1 million population) occupies an 
exceptional place on the Balkan Peninsula. Kosovo’s legitimacy has been disputed 
ever since it achieved the de-facto status of an UN protectorate in 1999. Although 
Kosovo is not unproblematically recognized as an independent state (especially 
by Serbia and Russia), the present political situation is that the international 
community did so in February 2008. Over the past decade, a tremendous amount 
of international aid has been invested in the capacity-building of state institutions, 
including the police (now about 6,300 personnel). Of major concern, however, 
is an apparent animosity between police forces and private security companies 
(employing 2,600 staff, although verifiable data is hard to obtain), deriving from 
the alleged contacts between commercial security personnel and ethnic (Albanian) 
armed gangs. Regulation of private security businesses is still in the hands of the 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The SEESAC report (2005) concludes 
that, despite its youth, the private security industry in Kosovo is doing relatively 
well. However, a potential source of instability is that substantial numbers of 
ex-paramilitary fighters have found employment in the industry. Entire former 
military units seem to be incorporated into private security companies, which may 
again spark war-time practises and culture.
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3.5 Bosnia-Herzegovina
Like Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, with 4.6 million citizens, 
caught the full blast of war over the first half of the 1990s. As a result, and in line 
with its unfortunate neighbors, the country experienced traumas arising from 
the systematic deployment of public police militia in ethnic cleansing, human 
right abuses, and large-scale corruption. Aitchison (2007) underlines traditions of 
Yugoslav security ‘self-management’, not merely structured around paramilitary 
lines, but also as an aspect of ‘services for hire’ akin to commercial guarding 
enterprises. With 2,000 (Sotlar, 2009: 497) to 4,000 registered staff (Kržalić, 2009: 
34), the private security industry is a comparatively minor player in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (even if the figures are not entirely reliable). It is hard to pinpoint 
how private security is exactly evolving throughout the country. As the SEESAC-
report underlines, ‘[u]nfortunately, there is still insufficient information about 
the industry. Many PSC staff approached for this research were suspicious and 
not willing to speak, while the general public and the media appear to have little 
interest in the topic. It seems that many government officials share this lack of 
interest, which accounts for the poor oversight of the sector’ (SEESAC, 2005: 25). 
Accordingly, there is virtual unanimity among researchers that the Bosnian private 
security industry is not appropriately regulated, nor properly overseen. In summer 
2006, stakeholders including representatives from the Bosnian government, 
international peacekeepers, observers and business groups adopted The Sarajevo 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies covering standards for the 
selection, recruitment and training of security guards, the ‘minimal use’ of firearms 
and force, and respect for human rights (Richards & Smith, 2007: 14). Working from 
a voluntary process, this code has laid the foundation for future improvement of 
the democratic regulation of private security activities within Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
if not abroad. In Kržalić’s view (2009), such steps have changed the situation for 
the better over the past few years. There are currently several pieces of legislation 
governing the private security industry which need to be harmonized. Nevertheless, 
Sotlar (2009) writes of recent scandals where private security officers were involved 
in large-scale robberies during money transportation. A more adequate compliance 
with procedures and regulations is necessary in order to build a more trustworthy 
industry.
3.6 Macedonia
Private security is largely an armed presence in Macedonia, a small country of just 
over 2 million inhabitants.  In terms of numbers, private security companies (16,000 
guarding staff) overshadow the police (12,000 officers), a 1:1.33 police/ private 
security ratio. Private security operates under the Law on Securing Property and 
Persons, and the Law on Detective Activity, both adopted in 1999 and amended in 
2007. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior and the Chamber for Securing Persons 
and Property are responsible for supervision and control of security companies and 
detective agencies. These governmental bodies share roles in organizing exams 
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and issuing licenses. They are also active in repressing and excluding undesirable 
elements within the industry. Nonetheless, observers claim that existing legislation 
has ‘already been taken over by practice’ (Spaseski, 2009: 311) and ‘is becoming 
more and more obsolete as the sector develops rapidly and innovation in this sphere 
appears inevitable’ (Gerasimoski, 2009: 320). Security personnel in (approximately) 
150 private security companies are estimated to hold at least 13,800 legally registered 
firearms (2003 statistics, according to the Ministry of Interior). In a large study 
commissioned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Grillot, Paes, 
Shelly and Stoneman (2004) reported on a ‘fragile peace’ being threatened by these 
gun holders (and those who own them illegally too) within the industry. Bakreski 
and Miloševska continue to urge for democratically-elected oversight by means 
of empowering parliamentary commissions ‘in a regional context where there 
exists an abundance of men of arms, and of elicit economic activities’ (Bakreski 
& Miloševska, 2009: 302). The Macedonian administration is on record as being 
desirous of strengthening accountability mechanisms among private security 
markets. New legislation would be capable of guaranteeing ‘a reasonably good 
basis’ (SEESAC, 2005: 58) for supervision and oversight of the industry.
3.7 Montenegro
Montenegro survived the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
remarkably peacefully. In May 2006, this country of less than 700,000 inhabitants 
voted for independence from the Republic of Serbia, a result that was quickly 
acknowledged by the international community. As in many other countries in 
the Balkans, organized crime is the chief security threat facing Montenegro, and 
it has been against this backdrop that private security companies are flourishing 
throughout the republic. There are now approximately 10 to 15 security companies 
that have been established since the end of communism, although the number of 
(armed) personnel they employ is largely unknown. Whilst 1,900 private security 
guards hold legal working permits, another 500 (or more) remain unregistered 
(SEESAC, 2005: 109). Several laws, such as the Law on Arms, and the Law on 
Business, have been designed to regulate the activities of all organizations and 
persons offering private protection services. There is compulsory registration 
at the Central Economic Court. Further specialist legislation is presently being 
drafted. The number of police staff is set at nearly 4,500, some of whom are 
‘moonlighting’; they undertake work as private security guards after hours. This is 
potentially worrisome if a conflict of interest arises from an officer’s dual functions 
in the public and private sectors. SEESAC notes that private security guards in 
Montenegro ‘do not attract a large amount of attention or concern’ (ibid.: 85). This 
finding can be interpreted either positively or negatively. On the one hand, most 
of the industry appears to carry out ‘legitimate work’ in response to the social and 
political transitions in Montenegro. On the other hand, citizens may be so used to 
high levels of corruption that they simply assume that guards operate in a ‘semi-
legitimate grey area with links to government, police, and criminal organizations’ 
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(ibid.: 85). Private security, in other words, is seen as no different from other 
economic sectors, good and bad, around the country.
4 PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE
Private security industries are rapidly expanding throughout the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia. This fact challenges the provision of policing in a number of 
ways. With the augmentation of private security, policing has been scattered away 
from the ‘blue colored’ public forces, challenging ‘many vital functions that states 
traditionally perform’ (Los, 2002: 176), including, for example, the protection of 
goods and people, law enforcement, and conflict resolution. This assumes that 
policing and, from a broader vantage point, the ‘governance of security’ (Johnston 
& Shearing, 2003) is decreasingly the role of state authorized bodies. Surveillance, 
crime prevention and ‘thief taking’ have become everybody’s business, with the 
growth of ‘marketized’ or ‘commercialized’ policing being the most pervasive 
development. From public service and common good perspectives, police work has 
changed irrevocably. Security is now something that people can buy and sell in a 
market. This must come as something of a shock to former socialist (or communist) 
systems that are based on collective ownership (Sotlar, 2009) but it should not be 
unexpected. After all, the crumbling of public authorities in the face of civil war 
gave a boost to the growth of private alternatives. Around ex-Yugoslavia, state 
police are now slowly but surely losing ground to neo-liberal ideologies.
A common objection with regards private security guards is that they are, by 
legal contract, required to act in an exclusionary manner, and will selfishly protect 
only those who have contracted with them, to the detriment of others. Moreover, 
the availability of policing and security services in an open marketplace allows 
wealthy individuals and organizations to buy more protection than their less 
privileged counterparts (Prenzler, 2004; Zedner, 2006). Another objection relates to 
the quality of private personnel; the low professionalism and potentially thug-like 
behavior of some security guards is well recognized (Livingstone & Hart, 2003; 
Prenzler & Sarre, 2008). In all, they have been termed a ‘necessary evil’ (van Steden 
& Sarre, 2010: 14), hired under pressure of external factors such as insurance 
companies’ standards or the incapacity of the state to guarantee a satisfactory level 
of public order. 
By the same token, however, post-conflict reconciliation – as is the current 
situation in a number of former Yugoslav republics – gives rise to much optimism 
about the benefits private security companies may have for the maintenance of 
social order. Slovenia, as an EU-member, is the unmistakable flag-bearer in this 
respect. Despite indifference and neglect between the police and private security 
sectors, the presence of guarding staff ‘significantly contributes to the internal 
security of the state’ (Nalla et al., 2006: 311). And, as Caparini emphasizes, ‘there is 
a legitimate role for private security in security governance, including in transition 
states … the private security approach can be complementary to that of the state’s 
police institutions’ (Caparini, 2006: 271). On this view, private security personnel are 
not a detrimental force, but rather a welcome response to governance deficits in as 
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much as they can generate positive outcomes in settings where state bureaucracies 
may be dysfunctional. Police and (para) military forces cannot, on their own, build 
peace. They need to assemble public-private partnerships, built upon mutual 
respect and trust between state and non-state sectors.
Finally, for public as well as private policing to function effectively and 
legitimately, proper accountability mechanisms must be in place. In academic 
circles it is repeatedly asserted that regulation of the private policing is usually 
inferior to that of the public police, while private security personnel, on the other 
hand, believe that they are adequately accountable for their performance. The 
truth is somewhat more subtle and lies between these two extremes. First, national 
accountability mechanisms vary greatly from ‘wide’ to ‘narrow’ in the extent to 
which different private security sectors – manned guarding services, private 
detectives, forensic accountants (or fraud investigators), installers of technical 
equipment, and the like – are regulated (Button, 2007). Second, the ‘depth’ of such 
regulation, ranging from minimum entrance requirements to strong compliance 
rules, also shows considerable discrepancy between nation-states (Button & 
George, 2006). In short, the purpose and effectiveness of accountability measures 
vary greatly around the globe.
Like in other regions of the European continent and beyond, as our brief survey 
highlights, regulatory models in former Yugoslavia are not uniform. For example, 
in Slovenia and Croatia legal standards are wide-ranging, whilst state legislation 
and regulation tend to be minimal in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. 
This may well explain why, in the former countries, private security has matured 
and stabilized more quickly than in the latter. Nonetheless, besides specific state-
led regulatory mechanisms, there are a number of broader ways to hold private 
security companies and their staff accountable. Although the regulatory effects 
of, for example, civil law, criminal law and market forces may be ad hoc and ill-
defined, their potential ‘to influence corporate and individual behavior cannot be 
overstated’ (Sarre & Prenzler, 1999: 21). Democratically anchored state policies, 
as well as self-regulatory mechanisms, are thus crucial to ensure private security 
personnel act correctly and respectfully, and in accordance with basic human 
rights.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper contains a literature review of the body of knowledge on private security 
in ex-Yugoslavia. It develops three arguments. First, we framed information 
about private security industries in this peculiar part of Europe within the extant 
literature. In so doing, we have set studies into ‘marketized’ post-conflict policing 
in a wider perspective of theoretical and empirical analysis. Second, we outlined 
the size and reach of security industries in the former Yugoslav republics. Private 
policing, in terms of personnel numbers, now occupies an important, if not essential, 
position alongside public police forces. Third, we found surprising confidence 
from observers in their assessments of the ways these industries are developing 
successfully today. ‘Though concerns about its professionalization and conduct 
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remain’, SEESAC (2005: 118) stresses, ‘the private security industry in South 
Eastern Europe has made great progress in terms of improved professionalism 
over the last decade or so, to the point where, in most cases, its members pose little 
or no security threat’. 
This is not to say, however, that private security companies pose no challenge at 
all. But the concerns vary considerably across the former Yugoslavia. The situation 
in, for example, Serbia and Macedonia is more problematic than in Slovenia and 
Croatia. It is hypothesized that the differences one finds reflect important political 
and judicial realities, and are dependent upon the state’s role in establishing and 
preserving good government in each country. Central to this hypothesis is the 
number of democratic ‘credentials’ public and private security agencies have, and 
the institutional creativity that states can develop. Such creativity is not restricted to 
national boundaries alone, as the ‘marketization’ or ‘commodification’ of policing 
and security has also allowed for, if not encouraged, the rise of multinational 
conglomerates (Johnston, 2000; Walker, 2003). Giant firms such as the Securitas 
Group and Group 4 Securicor have enabled the ‘globalization’ of commercialized 
security to develop, along with an inevitable harmonization of practices.
In order to gain a better understanding of the multifaceted (and complicated) 
phenomenon that is private security, researchers should now be tasked to assess the 
dichotomy of security in ‘advanced’ versus ‘weak’ states. The more democratically 
advanced a state bureaucracy is, the more capable it should be in regulating private 
security sectors; conversely, in weak or transitional states, we can probably expect 
that informal institutions will largely take over important governance functions 
(Dupont, Grabosky, & Shearing, 2003; Holmqvist, 2005). Not all of these informal 
institutions (one can quickly think of vigilante activities) will deliver desired 
and appropriate contributions to society. The absence of proper state regulation 
heightens the risk of organized crime infiltrating private security industries. In line 
with this, we urge researchers to explore innovative ways to shape the governance 
of security that make life difficult, if not impossible, for security personnel (and 
their masters) who do not carry out their functions in accordance with the law and 
having proper regard for fundamental human rights.
In summary, then, given that police, military and intelligence services can be 
both a problem for, and the solution to, good governance, democratic experiments 
in policing should not be limited to state agencies, but also involve non-state (civic 
as well as market-based) initiatives (Shearing & Kempa, 2000; Wood & Shearing, 
2007). Some examples might include the establishment of local boards that, in 
consultation with stakeholders (including police and private security companies, 
representatives of schools, social services and other civil society associations), are 
tasked to analyze the security needs of communities. The information that they 
glean should be used to shape response strategies. Citizens should then be kept 
informed about the work of all of the collaborating partners (Meško et al., 2005: 137-
138). To that end, the rise of commercialized security might not inevitably herald 
the ‘end of public policing’ (McLaughlin & Murji, 1995), but rather allow the state 
to regenerate or re-establish its democratic credentials. Our panoramic overview of 
the burgeoning private security industry in ex-Yugoslavia offers a starting point for 
future research into this interesting conundrum. It may be that the rise of private 
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security, rather than being a catalyst for policing trends that are unrepresentative, 
will, in fact, be the harbinger of greater democracy in policing.
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